Similar Search Results

Complements and substitutes in multilateral assignment markets

Tejada, Oriol - Facultat d'Economia i Empresa, Universitat de Barcelona - 2009

I prove that, in assignment markets with more than two sides, agents of different sides (or sectors) need not be complements, whereas agents of the same side need not be substitutes. Shapley (1962) showed that this cannot happen when assignment markets are bilateral. Nevertheless, I found...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004998476

Multi-sided Bohm-Bawerk assignment markets: the core

Tejada, Oriol - Facultat d'Economia i Empresa, Universitat de Barcelona - 2010

We introduce the class of multi-sided B ohm-Bawerk assignment games, which generalizes the well-kown two-sided B ohm-Bawerk assignment games to situations with an arbitrary number of sectors. We reach the extreme core allocations of any multi-sided B ohm- Bawerk assignment game by means of an...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008515122

An Examination of the Effect of Messages on Cooperation under Double-Blind and Single-Blind Payoff Procedures

Deck, Cary; Servátka, Maroš; Tucker, Steven - Department of Economics and Finance, College of … - 2012

Previous research has suggested that communication and especially promises in-crease cooperation in laboratory … the overall level of cooperation in our experiments with double-blind payoff procedures. However, we also find no evidence … that communication impacts cooperation in our experiments with single-blind payoff proce-dures. Further, the payoff …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010907406

Economic cooperation In Turkish culture: Public goods games and lonely elephants

Beranek, Benjamin; Duman, Alper - 2010

While the public good experiment has been used to analyze cooperation among various groups in Western Europe and North … altruistic punishment, to antisocial punishment, and ultimately to enhanced cooperation in Turkish society. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011807205

Honesty and Informal Agreements

Dufwenberg, Martin; Servátka, Maroš; Vadovic, Radovan - Department of Economics and Finance, College of … - 2015

We develop, and experimentally test, models of informal agreements. Agents are assumed to be honest but suffer costs of overcoming temptations. We extend two classical bargaining solutions -- split-the-difference and deal-me-out -- to this informal agreement setting. For each solution there are...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011199691

Status Quo Effects in Fairness Games: Reciprocal Responses to Acts of Commission vs. Acts of Omission

Cox, James C.; Servátka, Maroš; Vadovic, Radovan - Department of Economics and Finance, College of … - 2013

experiments is consistent with existing theory. The design of the experiments focuses on the axioms of revealed altruism theory …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010907397

Do People Keep Socially Unverifiable Promises?

Deck, Cary; Servátka, Maroš; Tucker, Steven - Department of Economics and Finance, College of … - 2011

Previous research has suggested that communication and especially promises increase cooperation in laboratory … increases the overall level of cooperation in our double blind experiment. However, our results are due in part to the high … level of cooperation that we observe, leading us to conduct additional single blind conditions. Ultimately, we find no …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009371391

Building Trust One Gift at a Time

Servátka, Maroš; Tucker, Steven; Vadovic, Radovan - Department of Economics and Finance, College of … - 2009

This paper reports an experiment evaluating the effect of gift giving on building trust in a relationship. We have nested our explorations in the standard version of the investment game. Our gift treatment includes a dictator stage in which the trustee decides whether to give a gift to the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005056480

Punishment with Uncertain Outcomes in the Prisoner’s Dilemma

Duersch, Peter; Servátka, Maroš - Department of Economics and Finance, College of … - 2009

This paper experimentally investigates whether risk-averse individuals punish less if the outcome of punishment is uncertain than when it is certain. Our design includes three treatments: Baseline in which the one-shot prisoner’s dilemma game is played; Certain Punishment in which the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005056481

A Note on the Cost-Benefit Ratio in Self-Enforcing Agreements

Hennlock, Magnus - Nationalekonomiska institutionen, Handelshögskolan - 2009

Since the analysis of a self-enforcing agreement by Barrett (1994) it has been clear that the ratio between the slopes of the marginal cost and marginal benefit functions is conclusive for stability of self-enforcing agreements. For example Finus and Rundshagen (1998) stated: 'it turns out that...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005651628