On the domain of two-sided assignment markets, the nucleolus is axiomatized as the unique solution that satisfies … characterization of the nucleolus by means of a strong form of the bisection property that characterizes the inter- section between the … core and the kernel of a coalitional game in Maschler et al (1979). …

There exist coalitional games with transferable utility which have the same core but different nucleoli. We show that … this cannot happen in the case of assignment games. Whenever two assignment games have the same core, their nucleoli also … coincide. To show this, we prove that the nucleolus of an assignment game coincides with that of its buyerseller exact …

not be balanced. Some conditions for balancedness are provided and, in that case, properties of the core are analyzed … the cores of two assignment games coincides with the core of the sum game. …

horse market games, are analyzed. The nucleolus is proved to coincide with the value, and is thus the midpoint of the core …

We provide explicit formulas for the nucleolus of an arbitrary assignment game with two buyers and two sellers. Five …

two sides. A symmetrically multilateral-bargained (SMB) allocation is a core allocation such that any agent is in … kernel-based set that, together with the core, characterizes the set of SMB. …

We study the behaviour of the extreme points of the core of a game in front of the reduction of the game and prove that … the extreme core points have the reduced game property but not the converse reduced game property. Nevertheless we give … some sufficient conditions on an extreme point of the core of a reduced game to extend to an extreme core point of the …

We characterize single-valued solutions of transferable utility cooperative games satisfying core selection and …

A necessary condition for the coincidence of the bargaining sets dened by Shimomura (1997) and the core of a … introduced. This necessary condition simply checks whether these vectors are core elements of the game. …