Showing 1 - 10 of 22
The main objective of this paper is to analyse the origins of the welfare state in Spain using the theoretical framework designed by Peter Lindert. With this aim, we offer an econometric analysis of the factors that determined the evolution of the Spanish social spending between 1880 and 1960....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005022348
Most of the studies about the welfare state have focused so far on the affluent democracies. However, poorer and non-democratic countries have deserved less attention. This paper provides new evidence on the evolution of social spending in both Spain and Portugal between 1950 and 1980. Since...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008493789
We develop, and experimentally test, models of informal agreements. Agents are assumed to be honest but suffer costs of overcoming temptations. We extend two classical bargaining solutions -- split-the-difference and deal-me-out -- to this informal agreement setting. For each solution there are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011199691
Both the law and culture make a central distinction between acts of commission that overturn the status quo and acts of omission that uphold it. In everyday life acts of commission often elicit stronger reciprocal responses than do acts of omission. In this paper we compare reciprocal responses...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010907397
Previous research has suggested that communication and especially promises in-crease cooperation in laboratory experiments. This has been taken as evidence for internal motivations such as guilt aversion or preference for promise keeping. The goals of this paper are to examine messages under a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010907406
Previous research has suggested that communication and especially promises increase cooperation in laboratory experiments. This has been taken as evidence for internal motivations such as guilt aversion or preference for promise keeping. The original goal of this paper was to examine promises...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009371391
I prove that, in assignment markets with more than two sides, agents of different sides (or sectors) need not be complements, whereas agents of the same side need not be substitutes. Shapley (1962) showed that this cannot happen when assignment markets are bilateral. Nevertheless, I found...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004998476
This paper reports an experiment evaluating the effect of gift giving on building trust in a relationship. We have nested our explorations in the standard version of the investment game. Our gift treatment includes a dictator stage in which the trustee decides whether to give a gift to the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005056480
This paper experimentally investigates whether risk-averse individuals punish less if the outcome of punishment is uncertain than when it is certain. Our design includes three treatments: Baseline in which the one-shot prisoner’s dilemma game is played; Certain Punishment in which the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005056481
Since the analysis of a self-enforcing agreement by Barrett (1994) it has been clear that the ratio between the slopes of the marginal cost and marginal benefit functions is conclusive for stability of self-enforcing agreements. For example Finus and Rundshagen (1998) stated: 'it turns out that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005651628