This paper investigates the role of guilt aversion for corruption in public administration. Corruption is modeled as the outcome of a game played between a bureaucrat, a lobby, and the public. There is a moral cost of corruption for the bureaucrat, who is averse to letting the public down. We...

This paper studies an evolutionary model of network formation with endogenous decay, in which agents benefit both from direct and indirect connections. In addition to forming (costly) links, agents choose actions for a coordination game that determines the level of decay of each link. We address...

This paper studies how external incentives can help agents to coordinate in summary-statistic games. Agents follow a myopic best-reply rule and face a trade-off between efficiency and strategic uncertainty. A principal can help agents to coordinate on the Pareto optimal equilibrium by monitoring...

We study the long-run stochastic stability properties of volunteering strategies in finite populations. We allow for mixed strategies, characterized by the probability that a player may not volunteer. A pairwise comparison of evolutionary strategies shows that the strategy with a lower...

We propose a learning dynamic with agents using samples of past play to estimate the distribution of other players' strategy choices and best responding to this estimate. To account for noisy play, estimated distributions over other players' strategy choices have full support in the other...

Interrelated global crises - climate change, pandemics, loss of ecosystem services and biodiversity - pose risks that demand collective solutions. Uncertainty about others' behavior, coupled with the dependence on some to take collective efforts to mitigate risks for all (e.g. conservation of...

Financial misbehavior is widespread and costly. The Dutch government legally requires every employee in the financial sector to take a Hippocratic oath, the so-called "banker's oath." We investigate whether nudges that (in)directly remind financial advisers of their oath affect their service. In...

This paper investigates whether distributional conflicts become more likely when groups are involved in the fight. We present results from a laboratory experiment in which two parties can appropriate resources via a contest or, alternatively, take an outside option. Keeping monetary gains...

We study experimentally the protection of property in five widely distinct countries-Austria, Mexico, Mongolia, South Korea and the United States. Our main results are that the security of property varies with experimental institutions, and that our subject pools exhibit significantly different...

In laboratory experiments we explore the effects of communication and group decision making on investment behavior and on subjects' proneness to behavioral biases. Most importantly, we show that communication and group decision making does not impact subjects' overall proneness to biases like...