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Collateral and Adverse Selection in Transition Countries
Weill, Laurent; Godlewski, Christophe J. - Laboratoire de Recherche en Gestion (LaRGE), Institut … - 2008
countries. We use a unique dataset of about 400 bank loans from 16 transition countries. Our findings support the view of a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005811640
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Why Do Banks Ask for Collateral and Which Ones ?
Blazy, Régis; Weill, Laurent - Laboratoire de Recherche en Gestion (LaRGE), Institut … - 2006
the reasons vary according to the type of collateral. We use a unique dataset of bank loans granted to French distressed … of the bank to secure a loan, as no type of collateral helps to solve adverse selection and moral hazard problems. The …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005509719
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Does Collateral Help Mitigate Adverse Selection? A Cross-Country Analysis
Weill, Laurent; Godlewski, Christophe J. - Laboratoire de Recherche en Gestion (LaRGE), Institut … - 2006
bank loans from 43 countries. We test whether the degree information asymmetries affects the link between the presence of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005509720
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Syndicated Loans in Emerging Markets
Godlewski, Christophe J.; Weill, Laurent - Laboratoire de Recherche en Gestion (LaRGE), Institut … - 2007
There has been a considerable expansion of the volume of syndicated loans in emerging markets in the recent years. We provide the first analysis of the determinants of the decision of banks to syndicate a loan on a sample of loan facilities from 50 emerging countries. We show the significant...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005509723