This paper analyses the evaluation of the relative performance of a set of groups when their outcomes are defined in terms of categorical data and the groups’ members are heterogeneous. This type of problem has been dealt with in Herrero and Villar (2012) for the case of a homogenous...

In this paper we analyze the strategic decisions of the government, the incumbent and the pirate in a market where the good is piratable. We show that deterred or accommodated piracy can occur in equilibrium, but pure monopoly cannot occur for any anti-piracy policy. We also show that the...

This paper provides a criterion to evaluate the overall performance of a given number of groups whose members can be of different types, out of the analysis of their relative frequencies. Assuming that types can be ordered from best to worse, the starting point is that of dominance relations in...

A modifica.tion of the proportional solution for bargaining with claims problems is proposed. This solution is construct.ed by considering an endogenous reference point. Characterization results are provided when the feasible set is not necessarily convex.

A unified approach to the problems of bargaining with a reference point and of bargaining with claims is addressed. Then, two solutions are reexamined from this perspective: the lexicographic egalitarian and the lexicographic claim-egalitarian. New characterization results are also provided.

This paper deals with the analysis of allocation problems with single peaked preferences, under the condition of agenda-independence (that is, when the allocation rule yields the same final outcome, no matter how the problem is subdivided into partial problems). Since the Uniform rule does not...

We examine an adverse selection relationship in which the principal is unaware of the ex ante distribution of the agent's types. We show that the minimax regret mechanism, which is an incentive compatible and individually rational mechanism that minimizes the maximal principal's regret, requires...

The problem of distributing a given amount of a divisible good among a set of agents which may have individual entitlements is considered here. A solution to this problem, called the Rights-Egalitarian Solution, is proposed and characterized. This allocation rule divides equally among the agents...

In this paper a numerical representation of preferences by means of subsets of the real line is proposed. This representation turns out to be natural for partial orderings. Some results on this representation, extending those for utility functions and pairwise representations, are provided for...