This paper analyses the evaluation of the relative performance of a set of groups when their outcomes are defined in terms of categorical data and the groups’ members are heterogeneous. This type of problem has been dealt with in Herrero and Villar (2012) for the case of a homogenous...

This paper provides a criterion to evaluate the overall performance of a given number of groups whose members can be of different types, out of the analysis of their relative frequencies. Assuming that types can be ordered from best to worse, the starting point is that of dominance relations in...

A modifica.tion of the proportional solution for bargaining with claims problems is proposed. This solution is construct.ed by considering an endogenous reference point. Characterization results are provided when the feasible set is not necessarily convex.

A unified approach to the problems of bargaining with a reference point and of bargaining with claims is addressed. Then, two solutions are reexamined from this perspective: the lexicographic egalitarian and the lexicographic claim-egalitarian. New characterization results are also provided.

This paper deals with the analysis of allocation problems with single peaked preferences, under the condition of agenda-independence (that is, when the allocation rule yields the same final outcome, no matter how the problem is subdivided into partial problems). Since the Uniform rule does not...

The problem of distributing a given amount of a divisible good among a set of agents which may have individual entitlements is considered here. A solution to this problem, called the Rights-Egalitarian Solution, is proposed and characterized. This allocation rule divides equally among the agents...

In this paper a numerical representation of preferences by means of subsets of the real line is proposed. This representation turns out to be natural for partial orderings. Some results on this representation, extending those for utility functions and pairwise representations, are provided for...

The purpose of this paper is to provide a new solution concept for bargaining problems, which modifies Chun's Equal-Loss Solution in a way that ensures the individual rationality. We also consider its lexicographic extension which turns out to be both individually rational and Pareto Optimal....

Some shortcomings of the equal-loss solution for bargaining problems are noticed: in general, it is not individually rational, and in case it is, then turns out a selection of the YU solutions. Finally, a new way of proving characterization results is provided.

Starting from a finite or countable set of states of health, and assuming the existence of an objective transitive preference relation on that set, we propose a way of performing interpersonal comparisons of states of health among individuals of different type. Then, a way of evaluating health...