This paper analyzes the problem of designing mechanisms to implement efficient solutions in economies with externalities. We provide two simple mechanisms implementing the Pigouvian Social Choice Correspondence in environments in which coalitions can be formed. Finally, we study economies in...

This paper provides three simple mechanisms to implement allocations in the core of matching markets. We analyze some sequential mechanisms which mimic matching procedures for many-to-one real life matching markets. We show that only core allocations should be attained when agents act...

Competition has long been regarded as productivity enhancing. Understanding the mechanism by which competition affects innovation and productivity is therefore an important topic for economic policy. The main contribution of this paper is to disentangle the relationship between competition and...

This paper studies simple hiring procedures for job markets. We show that when agents act strategically only individually rational outcomes should be expected. Moreover, If agents can form unions, thereby gaining the possibility to commit on the decision to be chosen, only stable allocations are...

We implement the core correspondence in Subgame Perfect Equilibrium using a simplesequential mechanism in which firms propose a salary to each worker (in the first stage). Then ,each worker accepts at most one proposal (second stage). Moreover, we show that, if agents'preferences are additive,...

In this paper, we study the return to human capital variables for wages of workers observed in Tunisian matched worker-firm data in 1999. We develop a new method based on multivariate analysis of firm characteristics, which allows us most of the benefits obtained by introducing firm dummies in...

In this paper we analyze firms' ability to tacitly collude on pricesin an infinitely repeated duopoly game of vertical productdifferentiation. We show that firms collude if and only if their discountfactor is high enough, i.e. if they value future profits sufficiently. We alsoshow that a lower...

We characterize the incentive compatible allocation that maximizes the expected social surplus in a single-unit sale when the efficient allocation is not implementable. This allocation may involve no selling when it is efficient to sell. We then show that the English auction always implements...

From Tunisian matched worker-firm data in 1999, we study the returns to human capital for workers observed in two leading manufacturing sectors. Workers in the mechanical and electrical industries (IMMEE) benefit from higher returns to human capital than their counterparts in the...

In this paper, we study the return to human capital variables for wages of workers observed in Tunisian matched worker-firm data in 1999. This reveals us how returns to human capital in a Less Developed Country like Tunisia may differ from the industrial countries usually studied with matched...