In this paper we present a market-based mechanim for allocating public goods which implements the Ratio correspondence in both Nash and Strong Equilibria.

The theory of mechanism design and implementation abounds with clever mechanisms whose equilibrium outcomes are optimal according to some social choice rule. However, the cleverness of these mechanisms relies on intricate systems of rewards and punishments off-the-equilibrium path. Generally, it...

In this paper we present a set of axioms guaranteeing that, in exchange economies with or without indivisible goods, the set of Nash, Strong and active Walrasian Equilibria all coincide in the framework of market games.

Since the 1970's most industrialized countries have undertaken massiveinvestment in computers and information technology (IT). Several stylizedfacts emerge from the empirical studies, see Landauer, 1993. In particular,they have found that this investment has not lead to a general increase...