We introduce the serial contest by building on the desirable properties of two prominent contest games. This family of contest games relies both on relative efforts (as Tullock's proposal) and on absolute effort differences (as difference-form contests). An additional desirable feature is that...

We analyze (non-deterministic) contests with anonymous contest success functions. There is no restriction on the number of contestants or on their valuations for the prize. We provide intuitive and easily verifiable conditions for the existence of an equilibrium with properties similar to the...

This paper analyzes the possibility of irnplementing stable outcomes for marriage markets. Our first result shows a contradiction between the use of stable mechanisins and the hypotesis of agents' behaviour consiclered in the Nash equilibriurn concept . We analyze the possibility of...

This paper follows the interpretation of the bankruptcy problems in terms of TU games given in O'Neill (1982). In this context we propose the analysis of the Transition Game associated to each bankruptcy problem. We explore an old solution described by Ibn Ezra in the XII century. Firstly, we...

This paper examines a situation in which the production activities of different agents, in a common geographical location, create waste products that are either of a similar biological or chemical composition or offer commercially compatible combinations. What we propose here, therefore, is a...

Two stability concepts for one-sided matching markets are analyzed: Gale- Chapley stability and S-stability. The first one applies best to markets were no status quo allocation is considered, whereas the second one is a solution to be used when property rights are allowed. A common problem of...

This paper studies a class of NTU coalition formation games in which every player's payoff depends only on the members of her coalition. We identify four natural conditions on individuals' preferences and show that, under each condition, stable (core) allocations exists.

This paper studies the sequential mechanisms which mimic matching procedures formany-to-one-real-life matching markets. We provide a family of mechanisms implementing thestudent´ optimal allocation in subgame perfect equibrium.

This paper introduces a property over agents' preferences, called Tops Responsiveness Condition. Such a property guarantees that the core in Hedonic Coalition Formation games is not empty. It is also shown that a mechanism exists that selects a stable allocation. It turns out that this...

This paper studies simple hiring procedures for job markets. We show that when agents act strategically only individually rational outcomes should be expected. Moreover, If agents can form unions, thereby gaining the possibility to commit on the decision to be chosen, only stable allocations are...