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neglects the effects of failed collusion attempts. In such contingencies, information revealed in the negotiation process is … likely to affect the bidding behavior in first-price (but not second-price) auctions. We test experimentally a setup in which … collusion is possible, but negotiations often break down and information is revealed in an asymmetric way. The existing …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010472820
favorable tie-breaking rules can reduce the discouragement effect and increase the designer's revenue. We test these predictions …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011473887
game of incomplete information between firms and workers. Workers have almost aligned preferences over firms: each worker … signalling mechanism is harmful for this environment. Though signals transmit previously unavailable information, they also … facilitate information asymmetry that leads to coordination failures. As a result, the introduction of a signalling mechanism …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008737789
We consider a game of information transmission, with one informed decision maker gathering information from one or more … informed senders. Private information is (conditionally) correlated across players, and communication is cheap talk. For the … on the incentives to report information truthfully is non monotone, and correlation may discipline senders' equilibrium …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010189326
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013331071
In a common value auction in which the information partitions of the bidders are connected, all rings are core …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008737094
wants to elicit the agents' private information about both preferences and network connections. As a benchmark for an …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011660366
information and conflicting interests. Senders can misreport information at a cost that is tied to the size of the … misrepresentation. The main results concern the amount of information that is transmitted in equilibrium and the language used by … senders to convey such information. Fully revealing and pure-strategy equilibria exist but are not plausible. I first identify …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013463788
We study auction design when parties cannot commit themselves to the mechanism. The seller may change the rules of the game and the buyers choose their outside option at all stages. We assume that the seller has a leading role in equilibrium selection at any stage of the game. Stationary...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011591004
We prove the existence of an increasing equilibrium, and study the comparative statics of correlation in the k-double auction with affiliated private values. This is supposedly the simplest bilateral trading mechanism that allows for dependence in valuations between buyers and sellers. In the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599188