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The maximal payoff and coalition formation in coalitional games
Zhao, Jingang (contributor) - 2008
This paper first establishes a new core theorem using the concept of generated payoffs: the TU (transferable utility …) core is empty if and only if the maximum of generated payoffs (mgp) is greater than the grand coalition’s payoff v(N), or …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003715105
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Von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable sets in two-sided matching
Mauleon, Ana (contributor);  … - 2008
We adopt the notion of von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable sets to predict which matchings are possibly stable when agents are farsighted in one-to-one matching problems. We provide the characterization of von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable sets: a set of matchings is a von...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003715117
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Core and stable sets of exchange economies with externalities
Graziano, Maria Gabriella; Meo, Claudia; Yannelis, … - 2021
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012803201
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Size monotonicity and stability of the core in hedonic games
Dimitrov, Dinko; Sung, Shao Chin - 2011
We show that the core of each strongly size monotonic hedonic game is not empty and is externally stable. This is in … sharp contrast to other sufficient conditions for core non-emptiness which do not even guarantee the existence of a stable … set in such games. -- Core ; Hedonic Games ; Monotonicity ; Stable Sets …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009231740
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On the nonemptiness of approximate cores of large games
Allouch, Nizar; Wooders, Myrna Holtz - 2014
We provide a new proof of the non-emptiness of approximate cores of games with many players of a finite number of types. Earlier papers in the literature proceed by showing that, for games with many players, equal-treatment cores of their "balanced cover games", which are non-empty, can be...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010472889
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Pairing games and markets
Alkan, Ahmet; Tuncay, Alparslan - 2014
Pairing Games or Markets studied here are the non-two-sided NTU generalization of assignment games. We show that the Equilibrium Set is nonempty, that it is the set of stable allocations or the set of semistable allocations, and that it has several notable structural properties. We also...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010350435
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Network formation and social coordination
Goyal, Sanjeev (contributor);  … - 2003 - [Elektronische Ressource]
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001867629
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Coalitional matchings
Dimitrov, Dinko (contributor);  … - 2008
would like to learn from. In this setup, we examine how the existence of core stable partitions on the distinct market sides … respect common rankings shape the existence of core stable coalitional matchings. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003715272
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Climate coalitions : a theoretical and computational appraisal
Bréchet, Thierry (contributor);  … - 2007
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003547464
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Incentivizing cooperation in noncooperative games I : simple transfers in games of income
Dubey, Pradeep; Sahi, Siddhartha - 2020
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012434474