. The minimal (for inclusion) dominant set is non-empty and for a game with a non-empty coalition structure core, the … minimal dominant set returns this core. …

This paper reinterprets the γ-core (Chander and Tulkens (1995, 1997)) and justifies it as well as its prediction that … the efficient coalition structure is stable in terms of the coalition formation theory. It is assumed that coalitions can …

We generalise the coalition structure core to partition function games. Our definition relies only on one crucial … initial one, and – whenever this is possible – they come to a residual core outcome. Deviating players form their optimistic … or pessimistic expectations with this in mind. This leads to a recursive definition of the core. When compared to …

This paper first establishes a new core theorem using the concept of generated payoffs: the TU (transferable utility …) core is empty if and only if the maximum of generated payoffs (mgp) is greater than the grand coalition’s payoff v(N), or …

of steps. We use elementary tools of graph theory and a representation theorem obtained here. …

We show that the core of each strongly size monotonic hedonic game is not empty and is externally stable. This is in … sharp contrast to other sufficient conditions for core non-emptiness which do not even guarantee the existence of a stable … set in such games. -- Core ; Hedonic Games ; Monotonicity ; Stable Sets …