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) core is empty if and only if the maximum of generated payoffs (mgp) is greater than the grand coalition’s payoff v(N), or …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003715105
A coalitional matching is a two-sided matching problem in which agents on each side of the market may form coalitions such as student groups and research teams who - when matched - form universities. We assume that each researcher has preferences over the research teams he would like to work in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003715272
We study hedonic games with heterogeneous player types that reflect her nationality, ethnic background, or skill type. Agents' preferences are dictated by status-seeking where status can be either local or global. The two dimensions of status define the two components of a generalized constant...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008737786
Pairing Games or Markets studied here are the non-two-sided NTU generalization of assignment games. We show that the Equilibrium Set is nonempty, that it is the set of stable allocations or the set of semistable allocations, and that it has several notable structural properties. We also...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010350435
We provide a new proof of the non-emptiness of approximate cores of games with many players of a finite number of types. Earlier papers in the literature proceed by showing that, for games with many players, equal-treatment cores of their "balanced cover games", which are non-empty, can be...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010472889
We show that the core of each strongly size monotonic hedonic game is not empty and is externally stable. This is in sharp contrast to other sufficient conditions for core non-emptiness which do not even guarantee the existence of a stable set in such games. -- Core ; Hedonic Games ;...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009231740
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coalition theory, we find that the potential benefits of water trade may not be sufficient to make all agents in the river … Sharing ; Water Trade ; Market Emergence ; Property Rights ; Coalition Stability …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009535545
Assume that players strictly rank each other as coalition partners. We propose a procedure whereby they "fall back" on … their preferences, yielding internally compatible, or coherent, majority coalition(s), which we call fallback coalitions. If … there is more than one fallback coalition, the players common to them, or kingmakers, determine which fallback coalition …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008810998