of an international climate agreement. Although there are strong free-rider incentives, we find a stable grand coalition …

international agreement on emission reductions. We consider a situation where a coalition of countries does not cooperate on …. The equilibrium size of such a coalition, as well as equilibrium emissions, depends on the distribution across countries … of countries will reduce (or leave unchanged) the equilibrium coalition size. However, the effect of such an increase in …

the coalition information exchange decreases until a minimum participation consisting of three countries is reached. We … also find that the grand coalition is stable if the countries sign an international research joint venture but in this case …

developing countries) enter a coalition only if they do not have to reduce as much. While equity preferences improve upon the … in population size and per capita emissions, generally no coalition will be stable without restrictions on entry into or … exit out of a coalition. In such a situation, equity-orientation does not improve upon the prospects for cooperation. …

from the standard assumption of joint welfare maximization of coalition members, implying ambitious abatement targets and …

coalition, and regions which have the highest claims according to the respective sharing rule. Furthermore, we find that a …

theory. …

This paper compares stability of international environmental agreements for six different rules of coalition formation …

-cooperative coalition formation game. In the first stage, countries set the minimum coalition size that is necessary for the treaty to come … signatories the coalition size are determined. This paper shows that a non-trivial partial coalition, sustained by a binding …