During the last decades, a number of studies have been concerned with communication related to new product development. These have looked at either intra-organizational communication between departments or communication between new product development teams and external stakeholders such as...

The paper shows that Perfect Bayesian equilibria need not be unique in the strategic communication game of Crawford and Sobel (1982). First, different equilibrium partitions of the state space can have equal cardinality, despite fixed prior beliefs. Hence, there can be different equilibrium...

This paper develops a semiotic-inferential model of verbal communication for incomplete information games: a language is seen as a set of conventional signs that point to types, and the credibility of a message depends on the strategic context. Formally, there is an encoding-decoding step where...

The paper investigates the determinants of cosmopolitan cities. The hypothesis tested empirically is whether gradual improvements in distant communication boost the generation of ethnically heterogeneous cities. Consequently to easier communication, movers increasingly rely on an enlarged...

The paper addresses the mechanism design problem of eliciting truthful information from a committee of informed experts who collude in their information disclosure strategies. It is shown that under fairly general conditions full information disclosure is possible if and only if the induced...

We put forward a model of private goods with externalities. Agents derive benefit from communicating with each other. In order to communicate they need to have a language in common. Learning languages is costly. In this setting no individually rational and feasible Groves mechanism exists. We...