This paper first establishes a new core theorem using the concept of generated payoffs: the TU (transferable utility …) core is empty if and only if the maximum of generated payoffs (mgp) is greater than the grand coalition’s payoff v(N), or …

characterize the core as a function of the utility's parameter values and show that in all cases the corresponding cores are non …-empty. We further discuss the core stable outcomes in terms of their segregating versus integrating properties. -- Coalitions … ; Core ; Stability ; Status-seeking …

, we prove the non-emptiness of the fuzzy rejective core. Then, via Konovalov (1998, 2005)'s equivalence result, we solve …

sell-side). This simple and intuitive learning process implements core allocations even though agents have no knowledge of …

We show that the core of each strongly size monotonic hedonic game is not empty and is externally stable. This is in … sharp contrast to other sufficient conditions for core non-emptiness which do not even guarantee the existence of a stable … set in such games. -- Core ; Hedonic Games ; Monotonicity ; Stable Sets …

This paper deals with a core-equilibrium equivalence in an economy with public goods where preferences of consumers … ; Edgeworth ; Core ; Decentralization …

. -- Backward induction ; Coalition ; Core ; Weak dominance …