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We propose a stylized model of a problem-solving organization whose internal communication structure is given by a fixed network. Problems arrive randomly anywhere in this network and must find their way to their respective specialized solvers by relying on local information alone. The...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011603091
This paper models the dynamic process through which a large society may succeed in building up its social capital by establishing a stable and dense pattern of interaction among its members. In the model, agents interact according to a collection of infinitely repeated Prisoner's Dilemmas played...
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Why do women hit the glass ceiling? Women are hired, but then fail to rise through the ranks. We propose a novel explanation for this pattern, namely preference- and belief-free discrimination. In our setting, an employer can increase effort by inducing differential value distributions for a...
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We consider a game of information transmission, with one informed decision maker gathering information from one or more informed senders. Private information is (conditionally) correlated across players, and communication is cheap talk. For the one sender case, we show that correlation...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010189326
We introduce two pieces of information, denoted memes, into a diffusion process in which memes are transmitted when individuals meet and forgotten at an exogenous rate. At most one meme can be transmitted at a meeting, which introduces opportunity costs in the process. Individuals differ...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011279690
I examine a setting, where an information sender conducts research into a payoff-relevant state variable, and releases information to agents, who consider joining a coalition. The agents' actions can cause harm by contributing to a public bad. The sender, who has commitment power, by designing...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011660390
We study private communication in social networks prior to a majority vote on two alternative policies. Some (or all) agents receive a private imperfect signal about which policy is correct. They can, but need not, recommend a policy to their neighbors in the social network prior to the vote. We...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599298
Organizations design their communication structures to improve decision-making while limiting wasteful influence activities. An efficient communication protocol grants completeinformation payoffs to all organization members, thereby overcoming asymmetric information problems at no cost. This...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013463790