Similar Search Results

Competing social identities and intergroup discrimination : evidence from a framed field experiment with high school students in Vietnam

Tam Kiet Vuong; Chan, Ho Fai; Torgler, Benno - 2021

that group identity is a key factor in the explanation of intergroup cooperation and competition. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012419371

Bargaining to lose the global commons

Chichilnisky-Heal, Natasha; Chichilnisky, Graciela - 2015

In "Bargaining to Lose: The Permeability Approach to Post Transition Resource Extraction" [1] Natasha Chichilnisky-Heal introduces an original and fertile explanation for the resource curse. Her "permeability" approach questions the treatment of the state as a decision maker having the public...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011438819

Farsightedness and cautiousness in coalition formation

Mauleon, Ana; Vannetelbosch, Vincent J. - 2003

We adopt the largest consistent set defined by Chwe [J. of Econ. Theory 63 (1994), 299-235] to predict which coalition structures are possibly stable when players are farsighted. We also introduce a refinement, the largest cautious consistent set, based on the assumption that players are...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011591399

Matching with myopic and farsighted players

Herings, Peter Jean-Jacques; Mauleon, Ana; … - 2017

We study stable sets for marriage problems under the assumption that players can be both myopic and farsighted. We introduce the new notion of the myopic-farsighted stable set. For the special cases where all players are myopic and where all players are farsighted, our concept predicts the set...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011672526

Optimal conservation policy under imperfect intergenerational altruism

Di Corato, Luca - 2011

. -- Imperfect Altruism ; Real Options ; Hyperbolic Discounting ; Time Inconsistency ; Natural Resources Management …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009380626

The Earnings Game with Behavioral Investors

Bachmann, Kremena; Hens, Thorsten - Institut für Schweizerisches Bankwesen <Zürich> - 2007

This paper studies how the investors attitude towards earnings surprises affects the managers incentives to manipulate earnings in an intertemporal context, where the consensus forecast of the analysts is not exogenously given but determined by the strategic interaction between the analysts...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005858045

Stakes Matter in Ultimatum Games

Andersen, Steffen; Ertaç, Seda; Gneezy, Uri; Hoffman, Moshe - 2011

The canonical bargaining game in economics is the ultimatum game, played by tens of thousands of students around the world over the past three decades. In the ultimatum game, first studied by Werner Guth, Rolf Schmittberger, and Bernd Schwarze (1982), the “proposer” proposes how to split a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012142368

Optimal Management of Evolving Hierarchies

Jens Leth, Hougaard; Juan D., Moreno-Ternero; Lars … - 2018

We study the optimal management of evolving hierarchies, which abound in real-life phenomena. An initiator invests into ﬁnding a subordinate, who will bring revenues to the joint venture and who will invest herself into ﬁnding another subordinate, and so on. The higher the individual...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012142392

Establishing cooperation between groups : ingroup versus outgroup punishment

Stoff, Christian (contributor) - 2006 - Revised: February 2006

We analyse interethnic cooperation in an infinitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma when members of one group are unable to … may sustain cooperation in this setting. Our main result, however, is that the introduction of ingroup punishment in … in situations where outgroup punishment alone fails to induce cooperation. Our findings are consistent with historical …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002521602

Bargaining and delay in trading networks

Bedayo, Mikel; Mauleon, Ana; Vannetelbosch, Vincent J. - 2013

We study a model in which heterogeneous agents first form a trading network where link formation is costless. Then, a seller and a buyer are randomly selected among the agents to bargain through a chain of intermediaries. We determine both the trading path and the allocation of the surplus among...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009702239