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Dynamic, incentive-compatible contracting for health services

Levaggi, Rosella; Moretto, Michele; Pertile, Paolo - 2023

This paper aims to characterise a dynamic, incentive-compatible contract for the provision of health services, allowing for both moral hazard and adverse selection. Patients' severity changes over time following a stochastic process and is private information of the provider. We characterise the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014342117

A theory of firm decline

Clementi, Gian Luca; Cooley, Thomas F.; Di Giannatale, Sonia - 2010 - This version: July 20, 2009

We study the problem of an investor that buys an equity stake in an entrepreneurial venture, under the assumption that the former cannot monitor the latter’s operations. The dynamics implied by the optimal incentive scheme is rich and quite different from that induced by other models of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008732070

Multiple losses, ex-ante moral hazard, and the non-optimality of the standard insurance contract

Breuer, Michael (contributor) - 2003 - [Elektronische Ressource]

Under certain conditions the optimal insurance policy will offer full coverage above a deductible, as Arrow and others have shown long time ago. Interestingly, the same design of insurance policies applies in case of a single loss and ex-ante moral hazard. However, many insurance policies...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001744785

Designing UISAs for developing countries

Cirelli, Fernando; Espino, Emilio; Sanchez, Juan M. - 2018

The benefits of implementing Unemployment Insurance Savings Accounts (UISAs) are studied in the presence of the multiple sources of information frictions often existing in developing countries. A benchmark incomplete markets economy is calibrated to Mexico in the early 2000s. The unconstrained...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011911462

Cream Skimming, Dregs Skimming, and Pooling: On the Dynamics of Competitive Screening

Lund, Diderik; Nilssen, Tore - 2003

to the the importance of the opposite: dregs skimming, whereby high-risk consumers are proÞtably detracted from the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012142264

Public Policy, Start-up Entrepreneurship, and the Market for Venture Capital

Nielsen, Søren Bo; Keuschnigg, Christian - 2006

In recent years, venture capital has become an important source for nancing young entrepreneurial rms. Given the apparently more innovative nature and extra value added of venture capital backed rms compared to other firms, policy makers have taken an increasing interest in an active venture...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012142333

The Emergence of Information Sharing in Credit Markets

Brown, Martin; Zehnder, Christian - Institut für Schweizerisches Bankwesen <Zürich> - 2007

We examine how asymmetric information and competition in the credit market affect voluntary information sharing between lenders. We study an experimental credit market in which information sharing can help lenders to distinguish goodborrowers from bad ones, because borrowers may exogenously...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005858065

Monopolistic screening under learning by doing

Gärtner, Dennis - 2007

This paper investigates the design of incentives in a dynamic adverse selection framework when agents’ production technologies display learning effects and agents’ rate of learning is private knowledge. In a simple two-period model with full commitment available to the principal, we show...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003892452

Competitive screening in insurance markets with endogenous wealth heterogeneity

Netzer, Nick; Scheuer, Florian - 2009 - Revised version

endogenously from unobservable savings or labor supply decisions. The endogeneity of wealth implies that high risk individuals may … irregular-crossing preferences. In our model, both risk and patience (or productivity) are privately observable. In contrast to … longer exhibit a monotone relation between risk and coverage. Individuals who purchase larger coverage are no longer higher …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003900923

Competition of e-commerce intermediaries

Matros, Alexander; Zapechelnyuk, Andriy - 2010

In e-commerce, where information collection is essentially costless and geographic location of traders matters very little, fierce competition between providers of similar services is expected. We consider a model where two e-commerce intermediaries (internet shops) compete for sellers. We show...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008746177

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