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Alkan, Ahmet; Tuncay, Alparslan - 2014

Pairing Games or Markets studied here are the non-two-sided NTU generalization of assignment games. We show that the Equilibrium Set is nonempty, that it is the set of stable allocations or the set of semistable allocations, and that it has several notable structural properties. We also...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010350435

The evolution of core stability in decentralized matching markets

Nax, Heinrich H.; Pradelski, Bary S. R.; Young, H. Peyton - 2013

sell-side). This simple and intuitive learning process implements core allocations even though agents have no knowledge of …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009756276

Allocation rules for network games

Jackson, Matthew O. - 2003

Previous allocation rules for network games, such as the Myerson Value, implicitly or explicitly take the network structure as fixed. In many situations, however, the network structure can be altered by players. This means that the value of alternative network structures (not just sub-networks)...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011591365

On the nonemptiness of approximate cores of large games

Allouch, Nizar; Wooders, Myrna Holtz - 2014

We provide a new proof of the non-emptiness of approximate cores of games with many players of a finite number of types. Earlier papers in the literature proceed by showing that, for games with many players, equal-treatment cores of their "balanced cover games", which are non-empty, can be...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010472889

Size monotonicity and stability of the core in hedonic games

Dimitrov, Dinko; Sung, Shao Chin - 2011

We show that the core of each strongly size monotonic hedonic game is not empty and is externally stable. This is in … sharp contrast to other sufficient conditions for core non-emptiness which do not even guarantee the existence of a stable … set in such games. -- Core ; Hedonic Games ; Monotonicity ; Stable Sets …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009231740

A core-equilibrium convergence in an economy with public goods

Allouch, Nizar - 2009

This paper deals with a core-equilibrium equivalence in an economy with public goods where preferences of consumers … ; Edgeworth ; Core ; Decentralization …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003827913

The minimal dominant set is a non-empty core-extension

Kóczy, László Á.; Lauwers, Luc - 2003

. The minimal (for inclusion) dominant set is non-empty and for a game with a non-empty coalition structure core, the … minimal dominant set returns this core. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011591676

The γ-core and coalition formation

Chander, Parkash - 2003

This paper reinterprets the γ-core (Chander and Tulkens (1995, 1997)) and justifies it as well as its prediction that …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011592935

Credible group stability in multi-partner matching problems

Konishi, Hideo; Ünver, M. Utku - 2003

(weak) core, unlike in many-to-one matching markets (Blair, 1988). In this paper, we seek a theoretical foundation for …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011593632

The core in the presence of externalities

Kóczy, Lásló À. - 2002

We generalise the coalition structure core to partition function games. Our definition relies only on one crucial … initial one, and – whenever this is possible – they come to a residual core outcome. Deviating players form their optimistic … or pessimistic expectations with this in mind. This leads to a recursive definition of the core. When compared to …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011596414