nodes in a communication network. However, communication through the network is noisy, which removes common knowledge about …

informed senders. Private information is (conditionally) correlated across players, and communication is cheap talk. For the … one sender case, we show that correlation unambiguously tightens the existence conditions for a truth-telling equilibrium …. We then generalize the model to an arbitrary number of senders, and we find that, in this case, the effect of correlation …

of an international climate agreement. Although there are strong free-rider incentives, we find a stable grand coalition …

Benefits ; Climate Policy ; Coalition Formation ; Game Theory ; Impure Public Goods …-cooperative coalition formation. In particular, we address the following questions. 1) Do ancillary benefits increase participation in …

sequential coalition formation process where players can make proposals which are either accepted or countered by other proposals … ; Sequential Coalition Formation ; Coordination through Moderator ; Integrated Assessment Model ; Algorithm for Computations …