We examine the formation of networks among a set of players whose payoffs depend on the structure of the network. We … variations of the transfer/bargaining aspect of link formation. One aspect is whether players can only make and receive transfers … links. We characterize the networks that are supported under these variations and show how each of the above aspects is …

This paper studies the payoff structure of stable cooperation structures in link formation games. Players choose non …-cooperatively with whom they want to form a link, and the payoffs are given by the Myerson value of the cooperation structure obtained …. We characterize the class of TU-games that ensure the stability of the full cooperation structure, which turns out to be …

alternative network structures (not just sub-networks) can and should influence the allocation of value among players on any given …

the overlapping case. We propose a cover function bargaining game which allows the formation of overlapping coalitions at … symmetric case. As an application, we establish an interesting link with the formation of networks. -- Overlapping Coalitions … ; Cover Function ; Bargaining ; Symmetric Game ; Network …

We consider a standard coalitional bargaining game where once a coalition forms it exits as in Okada (2011), however … bargaining solution is the unique stationary subgameperfect equilibrium. …

We study dynamic multilateral markets, in which players' payoffs result from coalitional bargaining. In this setting … this type in the market, adjusted by the type-specific bargaining power. Our framework may be viewed as an alternative to …. -- Multilateral Bargaining ; Dynamic Markets ; Labor Markets …

. -- Efficiency ; Bargaining Protocol ; Counterproposals ; Network Formation ; Transfers ; Externalities ; Groups ; Coalitions …

We study coalitional games where the proceeds from cooperation depend on the entire coalition structure. The coalition …