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Delayed perfect monitoring in an infinitely repeated discounted game is modelled by allocating the players to a connected and undirected network. Players observe their immediate neighbors’ behavior only, but communicate over time the repeated game’s history truthfully throughout the network....
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one sender case, we show that correlation unambiguously tightens the existence conditions for a truth-telling equilibrium …. We then generalize the model to an arbitrary number of senders, and we find that, in this case, the effect of correlation … on the incentives to report information truthfully is non monotone, and correlation may discipline senders' equilibrium …
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