We identify the core as an appealing stability concept of cooperative game theory, but argue that the non … we call H-game and show that strong Nash equilibria coalition structures in this game are identical to ?- and ?-core … stable coalition structures. Second, as a by-product of the definition of the H-game, we develop an extension called an I …

theory. …

This paper compares stability of international environmental agreements for six different rules of coalition formation …

from the standard assumption of joint welfare maximization of coalition members, implying ambitious abatement targets and …

We consider a standard coalitional bargaining game where once a coalition forms it exits as in Okada (2011), however … chosen with equal probability. If that is the case, she can choose any coalition she belongs to. However, a coalition can …

the efficient coalition structure is stable in terms of the coalition formation theory. It is assumed that coalitions can … coalitions) and a coalition may deviate if and only if it stands to gain from it. It is then shown that subsequent to a deviation … by a coalition, the nonmembers will have incentives to break apart into singletons, as is assumed in the definition of …

show the equivalence between the set of pairwise stable matchings and the set of matchings generated by coalition …

distribution of coalitional gains and the dynamics of coalition formation are characterized in four illustrative applications. …