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The paper studies the use of emission taxes and feed-in subsidies for the regulation of a monopoly that can produce the same good with a technology that employs a polluting input and a clean technology. The second-best tax and subsidy are calculated solving a two-stage policy game between the...
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In this article, we look at the combination of several market-based climate and energy policies and compare them with first best solution, i.e., a perfectly designed emission tax or emission cap level. It is shown that in the case an emission control policy is imperfect designed or implemented,...
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larger steady-state pollution stock. Moreover, the increase of environmental damages because of the increase in the pollution …
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We examine the impact of an optimal emissions tax on research and development of emission reducing green technology (E-R&D) in the presence of R&D spillovers. We show that the size and effectiveness of the optimal emissions tax depends on the type of the R&D spillover: input or output spillover....
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, it is not also a necessary condition. -- Emissions Trading ; Environmental Federalism ; Enforcement ; Monitoring Cost …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008799166
pollution is always followed by sequentially rational firm inspections. Comparisons with Franckx (2002a,2002b) show that …We consider an inspection game between $n$ polluting firms and an environmental enforcement agency. If the cost of … monitoring ambient pollution is low enough, the optimal inspection policy consists in imposing the maximal possible fine, and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011597940