This paper studies a noncooperative model of network formation. Built upon the two-way flow model of Bala and Goyal (2000a), it assumes that information decay as it flows through each agent, and the decay is increasing and concave in the number of his links. This assumption results in the fact...

Most literature in strategic network formation shows that there is a substantial tension between stability and efficiency. In this note, I show that such is not the case in the twoway flow model with small decay studied by Bala and Goyal (2000a) and De Jaegher and Kamphorst (2015). Specifically,...

Motivated by issues of imitation, learning and evolution, we introduce a framework of non-co-operative games, allowing both countable sets of pure actions and player types and player types and demonstrate that for all games with sufficiently many players, every mixed strategy Nash equilibrium...

We model a bipartite network in which links connect agents with public goods. Agents play a voluntary contribution game in which they decide how much to contribute to each public good they are connected to. We show that the problem of finding a Nash equilibrium can be posed as a non-linear...

This paper brings together analyses of two-way flow Strict Nash networks under exclusive player heterogeneity assumption and exclusive partner heterogeneity assumption. This is achieved through examining how the interactions between these two assumptions influence important properties of Strict...