Capacity Remuneration Mechanisms (CRM) can be used in power markets to overtake market failures, reaching security of supply. However, investment in capacity is a dynamic process, that depends on the evolution of prices and costs overtime. In our paper we study the capacity remuneration value...

This paper develops a dynamic model of competitive equilibrium in electricity markets with thermal, hydro and intermittent power sources. Thermal generators have positive and increasing costs and use a marketable input. Hydro generators use a free and uncertain input, but one that is storable....

Digital platforms facilitate interactions between consumers and merchants that allow collection of profiling information, which drives innovation and welfare. Private incentives, however, lead to information asymmetries resulting in market failures both on-platform, among merchants, and...

In this paper we consider a two periods model of cropping using irrigation. The farmer takes two kind of decisions, one related to the level of investment in irrigation capacity and the other one to the irrigation level in each period. In the first period, decisions are taken under uncertainty...

This paper examines capacity-constrained oligopoly pricing with sellers who seek myopic improvements. We employ the Myopic Stable Set solution concept and establish the existence of a unique pure-strategy price solution for any given level of capacity. This solution is shown to coincide with the...