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Alkan, Ahmet; Tuncay, Alparslan - 2014

Pairing Games or Markets studied here are the non-two-sided NTU generalization of assignment games. We show that the Equilibrium Set is nonempty, that it is the set of stable allocations or the set of semistable allocations, and that it has several notable structural properties. We also...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010350435

The evolution of core stability in decentralized matching markets

Nax, Heinrich H.; Pradelski, Bary S. R.; Young, H. Peyton - 2013

Decentralized matching markets on the internet allow large numbers of agents to interact anonymously at virtually no … sell-side). This simple and intuitive learning process implements core allocations even though agents have no knowledge of …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009756276

On the nonemptiness of approximate cores of large games

Allouch, Nizar; Wooders, Myrna Holtz - 2014

We provide a new proof of the non-emptiness of approximate cores of games with many players of a finite number of types. Earlier papers in the literature proceed by showing that, for games with many players, equal-treatment cores of their "balanced cover games", which are non-empty, can be...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010472889

Credible group stability in multi-partner matching problems

Konishi, Hideo; Ünver, M. Utku - 2003

(weak) core, unlike in many-to-one matching markets (Blair, 1988). In this paper, we seek a theoretical foundation for …It is known that in two-sided many-to-many matching markets, pair-wise stability is not logically related with the …-partner matching problem that includes two-sided matching problems as special cases. Under the same preference restriction, we also …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011593632

Kingmakers and leaders in coalition formation

Kilgour, Marc; Brams, Steven J. - 2009

Assume that players strictly rank each other as coalition partners. We propose a procedure whereby they "fall back" on their preferences, yielding internally compatible, or coherent, majority coalition(s), which we call fallback coalitions. If there is more than one fallback coalition, the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008810998

Equilibrium and matching under price controls

Herings, Peter Jean-Jacques - 2015

The paper considers a one-to-one matching with contracts model in the presence of price controls. This set-up contains … two important streams in the matching literature, those with and those without monetary transfers, as special cases and …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011279692

Stable matchings for a generalised marriage problem

Lahiri, Somdeb - 2003

We show that a simple generalisation of the Deferred Acceptance Procedure with men proposing due to Gale and Shapley (1962) yields outcomes for a generalised marriage problem, which are necessarily stable. We also show that any outcome of this procedure is Weakly Pareto Optimal for Men, i.e....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011593642

Stable matchings for the room-mates problem

Lahiri, Somdeb - 2003

-empty subset of agents S if (a) no agent in S prefers the first matching to the second, and (b) no agent in S and his room-mate in … S under the second matching prefer each other to their respective room-mates in the first matching, then no room-mate of … an agent in S prefers the second matching to the first. This result is a strengthening of a result originally due to …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011593838

Overlapping coalitions, bargaining and networks

Agbaglah, Messan; Ehlers, Lars H. - 2010

This paper extends the theory of endogenous coalition formation, with complete information and transferable utility, to the overlapping case. We propose a cover function bargaining game which allows the formation of overlapping coalitions at equilibrium. We show the existence of subgame perfect...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008737140

The coalitional Nash bargaining solution with simultaneous payoff demands

Nieva, Ricardo - 2015

We consider a standard coalitional bargaining game where once a coalition forms it exits as in Okada (2011), however, instead of alternating offers, we have simultaneous payoff demands. We focus in the producer game he studies. Each player is chosen with equal probability. If that is the case,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011296159

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