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A tragic solution to the collective action problem : implication for corruption, conflict and inequality

Nieva, Ricardo - 2020

We study the role of an enforcer in the effectiveness of selective incentives in solving the collective action problem when groups take part in a contest. Cost functions exhibit constant elasticity of marginal effort costs. If prize valuations are homogeneous, our source of heterogeneity induces...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012203665

Privatization, competition and corruption : how characteristics of bribe takers and payers after bribe payments to utilities

Clarke, George R. G.; Xu, Lixin Colin - 2002

Many recent studies have looked at the macroeconomic, cultural and institutional determinants of corruption at the … bribes and the firms paying bribes affect the equilibrium level of corruption in the sector. Bribe takers (utility employees … empirical literature on corruption is how to distinguish between the "endogenous harassment" and "speed money" theories of …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011597961

Salmonella program in the European Union and the trade dispute with Brazil at the World Trade Organisation : a partial equilibrium framework

Ghodsi, Mahdi - 2022

This contribution provides a cost-benefit analysis in a partial equilibrium framework to investigate the welfare … the welfare gains from the introduction of an NTM are explored. The results depend on consumer awareness and information …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013359004

Institutions for effective business-government collaboration : micro mechanisms and macro politics in Latin America

Schneider, Ben Ross - 2013

What makes for effective cooperation between government and business in industrial policy? Core research questions on the institutional design of arrangements for business-government interactions focus on three main functions: i) maximizing the benefits of dialogue and information exchange; ii)...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011303253

Designing contests between heterogeneous contestants : an experimental study of tie-breaks and bid-caps in all-pay auctions

Llorente-Saguer, Aniol; Sheremeta, Roman M.; Szech, Nora - 2016

A well-known theoretical result in the contest literature is that greater heterogeneity decreases performance of contestants because of the "discouragement effect." Leveling the playing field by favoring weaker contestants through bid-caps and favorable tie-breaking rules can reduce the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011473887

Transparency and government reputation : an experiment on signaling

Otálvaro-Ramírez, Susana; Scartascini, Carlos G.; … - 2025

Transparency initiatives are well-known tools to foster trust and empower citizens. To explain why some governments introduce them but others do not, we model these initiatives as a signal that complements the information provided by visible government performance and conduct a randomized survey...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015197814

Vote buying or campaign promises? : electoral strategies when party credibility is limited

Hanusch, Marek; Keefer, Philip; Vlaicu, Razvan - 2016

What explains significant variation across countries in the use of vote buying instead of campaign promises to secure voter support? This paper explicitly models the tradeoff parties face between engaging in vote buying and making campaign promises, and explores the distributional consequences...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011521218

Politics in the family : nepotism and the hiring decisions of Italian firms

Gagliarducci, Stefano; Manacorda, Marco - 2016

In this paper we investigate the effect of family connections to politicians on individuals' labor market outcomes. We combine data for Italy over almost three decades from longitudinal social security records on a random sample of around 1 million private sector employees with the universe of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011442303

Divide and conquer : noisy communication in networks, power, and wealth distribution

Pérez Oviedo, Wilson - 2004

In a society composed of a ruler and its citizens: what are the determinants of the political equilibrium between these two? This paper approaches this problem as a game played between a ruler who has to decide the distribution of the aggregate income and a group of agents/citizens who have the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011600156

Voluntary agreements under endogenous legislative threats

Glachant, Matthieu - 2003

The paper analyzes the welfare properties of voluntary agreements (VA) with polluters, when they are obtained under the … a polluter lobby group influencing the legislature. We show that a welfare-improving VA systematically emerges in …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011589992