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This paper studies the payoff structure of stable cooperation structures in link formation games. Players choose non-cooperatively with whom they want to form a link, and the payoffs are given by the Myerson value of the cooperation structure obtained. We characterize the class of TU-games that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011596618
Previous allocation rules for network games, such as the Myerson Value, implicitly or explicitly take the network structure as fixed. In many situations, however, the network structure can be altered by players. This means that the value of alternative network structures (not just sub-networks)...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011591365
This paper extends the theory of endogenous coalition formation, with complete information and transferable utility, to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008737140
result, microfinance institutions (MFIs) worldwide are increasingly shifting toward individual liability contracts. A key … contracts offer a promising path to reviving joint liability in microfinance. …Joint liability loans are used in various settings, including business partnerships, agricultural cooperatives, and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015419349
We propose a theory-based experimental approach to compare the properties of approval voting (AV) with those of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011407606
We study two n-player sequential network formation games with externalities. Link formation is tied to simultaneous transfer selection in a Nash demand like game in each period. Players in groups can counterpropose. We give necessary and sufficient conditions for efficiency in terms of cyclical...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008780592
to address the following open question in the theory of social and economic network formation: given the rules of network …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008811035
the efficient coalition structure is stable in terms of the coalition formation theory. It is assumed that coalitions can …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011592935
It is known that in two-sided many-to-many matching markets, pair-wise stability is not logically related with the (weak) core, unlike in many-to-one matching markets (Blair, 1988). In this paper, we seek a theoretical foundation for pairwise stability when group deviations are allowed. Group...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011593632
This paper proposes a model of multilateral contracting where players are engaged in two parallel interactions: they dynamically form coalitions and play a repeated normal form game with temporary and permanent decisions. This formulation encompasses many economic models with externalities and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011602846