A growing body of research argues that early adverse experiences have lasting effects not only on later health outcomes, but also on human capital accumulation. This paper investigates the persistent effect of negative shocks early in life on children's health and cognitive outcomes, and...

Flood damage assessments are often based on Stage-Damage Curve (SDC) models that estimate economic damage as a function of flood characteristics, typically flood depths, and land use. SDCs are developed through site-specific analysis but rarely adjusted to economic circumstances in areas to...

This chapter describes tools and a methodology to model wind and flood risks from tropical storms under present and future climate accounting for natural infrastructure. Wind forcing provide a crucial link to hydrodynamic models that can be used in risk assessments to estimate extent of and...

Are initial competitive advantages self-reinforcing, so that markets exhibit an endogenous tendency to be dominated by only a few firms? Although this question is of great economic importance, no systematic empirical study has yet addressed it. Therefore, we examine experimentally whether firms...

This paper studies the effects of patents and subsidies on R&D investment decisions. The theoretical framework is a two-stage game consisting of an investment and a market stage. In equilibrium, both patents and subsidies induce the same amount of R&D investment, which is higher than the...

We study (anti-) coordination problems in networks in a laboratory experiment. Partici- pants interact with their neighbours in a fixed network to play a bilateral (anti-) coordination game. Our main treatment variable is the extent to which players are heterogeneous in the number of connections...

An influential body of scholarship argues that corruption behaves as a selffulfilling prophecy. The idea of this work is that levels of corruption emerge endogenously as a result of a society-wide coordination game in which ther individual returns to corrupt behavior are a function of how...

We study both theoretically and experimentally the set of Nash equilibria of a classical one-dimensional election game with two candidates. These candidates are interested in power and ideology, but their weights on these two motives are not necessarily identical. Apart from obtaining the well...