Under the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM), introduced in 2014, systemically important euro area banks with combined assets of about 21,000 billion euros are directly supervised by the ECB. We examine from a static and a dynamic perspective how this fundamental shift to unified supervision...

The design of lender-of-last-resort interventions can exacerbate the bank-sovereign nexus. During sovereign crises, central bank provision of long-term liquidity incentivizes banks to purchase high yield eligible collateral securities matching the maturity of the central bank loans. Using unique...

This paper studies from an empirical and theoretical perspective the systemic and bank-level effects of imposing reserve requirements (RR) in foreign currency in an economy with a heavily dollarized financial system. The paper empirically characterizes banks responses to the RR carried out by...

We extend the Central Bank of Malta's core DSGE model - MEDSEA - with housing and financial frictions to capture the important theoretical links betweeen house prices, credit and consumption. The model features a rich set of features that are inherent to small open economies in a monetary union....

This study has a twofold objective. The first one is an assessment of the efficiency of monetary and capital-based macroprudential policy, defined as imposing less interest costs to loan borrowers (nonfinancial corporations and households). The second objective of this paper is the assessment of...

Annual stress tests have become a regular part of the supervisors' toolkit following the global financial crisis. We investigate their capital market implications in the United States by looking at price and trade reactions, information asymmetry and uncertainty indicators, and bank activities....

Macroprudential policy improves economic outcomes by reducing the likelihood and severity of financial crises. Yet it is pertinent to ask, are there unintended long run consequences to the introduction of a macroprudential policy regime, and are these consequences conditional on the a priori...

We design a new, implementable capital requirement for large financial institutions (LFIs) that are too big to fail. Our mechanism mimics the operation of margin accounts. To ensure that LFIs do not default on either their deposits or their derivative contracts, we require that they maintain an...