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Privatization, competition and corruption : how characteristics of bribe takers and payers after bribe payments to utilities
Clarke, George R. G.; Xu, Lixin Colin - 2002
Many recent studies have looked at the macroeconomic, cultural and institutional determinants of corruption at the … bribes and the firms paying bribes affect the equilibrium level of corruption in the sector. Bribe takers (utility employees … empirical literature on corruption is how to distinguish between the "endogenous harassment" and "speed money" theories of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011597961
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Salmonella program in the European Union and the trade dispute with Brazil at the World Trade Organisation : a partial equilibrium framework
Ghodsi, Mahdi - 2022
This contribution provides a cost-benefit analysis in a partial equilibrium framework to investigate the welfare … the welfare gains from the introduction of an NTM are explored. The results depend on consumer awareness and information …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013359004
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Institutions for effective business-government collaboration : micro mechanisms and macro politics in Latin America
Schneider, Ben Ross - 2013
What makes for effective cooperation between government and business in industrial policy? Core research questions on the institutional design of arrangements for business-government interactions focus on three main functions: i) maximizing the benefits of dialogue and information exchange; ii)...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011303253
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Designing contests between heterogeneous contestants : an experimental study of tie-breaks and bid-caps in all-pay auctions
Llorente-Saguer, Aniol; Sheremeta, Roman M.; Szech, Nora - 2016
A well-known theoretical result in the contest literature is that greater heterogeneity decreases performance of contestants because of the "discouragement effect." Leveling the playing field by favoring weaker contestants through bid-caps and favorable tie-breaking rules can reduce the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011473887
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Politics in the family : nepotism and the hiring decisions of Italian firms
Gagliarducci, Stefano; Manacorda, Marco - 2016
In this paper we investigate the effect of family connections to politicians on individuals' labor market outcomes. We combine data for Italy over almost three decades from longitudinal social security records on a random sample of around 1 million private sector employees with the universe of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011442303
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Vote buying or campaign promises? : electoral strategies when party credibility is limited
Hanusch, Marek; Keefer, Philip; Vlaicu, Razvan - 2016
What explains significant variation across countries in the use of vote buying instead of campaign promises to secure voter support? This paper explicitly models the tradeoff parties face between engaging in vote buying and making campaign promises, and explores the distributional consequences...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011521218
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Political competition and legislative shirking in roll-call votes : evidence from Germany for 1953-2017
Frank, Marco; Stadelmann, David - 2020
We analyze the impact of elected competitors from the same constituency on legislative shirking in the German Bundestag from 1953 to 2017. The German electoral system ensures that there is always at least one federal legislator per constituency with a varying number of elected competitors from...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012301926
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Voluntary agreements under endogenous legislative threats
Glachant, Matthieu - 2003
The paper analyzes the welfare properties of voluntary agreements (VA) with polluters, when they are obtained under the … a polluter lobby group influencing the legislature. We show that a welfare-improving VA systematically emerges in …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011589992
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Divide and conquer : noisy communication in networks, power, and wealth distribution
Pérez Oviedo, Wilson - 2004
In a society composed of a ruler and its citizens: what are the determinants of the political equilibrium between these two? This paper approaches this problem as a game played between a ruler who has to decide the distribution of the aggregate income and a group of agents/citizens who have the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011600156
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The consequences of corruption : evidences from China
Bin Dong; Torgler, Benno - 2010
With complementary Chinese data sets and alternative corruption measures, we explore the consequences of corruption …. Adopting a novel approach we provide evidence that corruption can have both, positive and negative effects, on economic … development. The overall impact of corruption might be the balance of the two simultaneous effects within a specific institutional …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008729042