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Rotten kids with bad intentions
Netzer, Nick; Schmutzler, Armin - 2010 - Rev. version January 2010
We examine a “Rotten Kid” model (Becker 1974) where a player with social preferences interacts with an egoistic player. We assume that social preferences are intentionbased rather than outcome-based. In a very general multi-stage setting we show that any equilibrium must involve mutually...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008695432
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Equilibrium selection in sequential games with imperfect information
Eguia, Jon X.; Llorente-Saguer, Aniol; Morton, Rebecca B.; … - 2014
Games with imperfect information often feature multiple equilibria, which depend on beliefs off the equilibrium path. Standard selection criteria such as passive beliefs, symmetric beliefs or wary beliefs rest on ad hoc restrictions on beliefs. We propose a new selection criterion that imposes...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010339744
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A theory of firm decline
Clementi, Gian Luca; Cooley, Thomas F.; Di Giannatale, Sonia - 2010 - This version: July 20, 2009
We study the problem of an investor that buys an equity stake in an entrepreneurial venture, under the assumption that the former cannot monitor the latter’s operations. The dynamics implied by the optimal incentive scheme is rich and quite different from that induced by other models of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008732070
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Bidding for conservation contracts
Di Corato, Luca; Dosi, Cesare; Moretto, Michele - 2014
require long-term commitments. Landowners, however, can decide to prematurely terminate the contract when the opportunity cost … views non-enforcement of contract terms as a source of real-options, the paper offers the following contributions. First, it … play in avoiding such potential bias in contract allocation. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010380650
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Procurement with unenforceable contract time and the law of liquidated damages
Dosi, Cesare; Moretto, Michele - 2012
. By exploiting the real-option approach, we examine how the inability to force sellers to meet the contract time … when the contract does not provide for any compensation for late-delivery. -- Public Procurement ; Fixed-Price Contracts …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009565538
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Cost uncertainty and time overruns in public procurement : a scoring auction for a contract with delay penalties
Dosi, Cesare; Moretto, Michele - 2017
suppliers, facing variable production costs, must simultaneously report the contract price and the cost level at which they …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599251
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Termination fees and contract design in public-private partnerships
Buso, Marco; Dosi, Cesare; Moretto, Michele - 2018
We study the effects of granting an exit option that enables the private party to early terminate a PPP project if it turns out to be loss-making. In a continuous time setting with hidden information about stochastic operating profits, we show that a revenue-maximizing government can optimally...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011925624
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Supply contracting under dynamic asymmetric cost informationl
Di Corato, Luca; Moretto, Michele - 2024
We consider a long-term contractual relationship in which a buyer procures a fixed quantity of a product from a supplier and then sells it on the market. The production cost is private information and evolves randomly over time. The solution to this dynamic principal-agent problem involves a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014478916
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On why affirmative action may never end and why it should
Jehiel, Philippe; Leduc, Matthew V. - 2021
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012643114
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Insurance and inequality with persistent private information
Bloedel, Alex; Krishna, R. Vijay; Leukhina, Oksana - 2018
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011914184