) core is empty if and only if the maximum of generated payoffs (mgp) is greater than the grand coalition’s payoff v(N), or …This paper first establishes a new core theorem using the concept of generated payoffs: the TU (transferable utility …

We show that the core of each strongly size monotonic hedonic game is not empty and is externally stable. This is in … sharp contrast to other sufficient conditions for core non-emptiness which do not even guarantee the existence of a stable … set in such games. -- Core ; Hedonic Games ; Monotonicity ; Stable Sets …

either core stability or strict core stability is under consideration, the existence problem of a stable coalition structure …We investigate the computational complexity of several decision problems in hedonic coalition formation games and … stable coalition structure and of an individually stable coalition structure turn out to be NP-complete in the strong sense …

would like to learn from. In this setup, we examine how the existence of core stable partitions on the distinct market sides … respect common rankings shape the existence of core stable coalitional matchings. …

characterize the core as a function of the utility's parameter values and show that in all cases the corresponding cores are non …-empty. We further discuss the core stable outcomes in terms of their segregating versus integrating properties. -- Coalitions … ; Core ; Stability ; Status-seeking …

coalition, (i) market pruning dominates product proliferation and (ii) partial cartelisation always arises in equilibrium, with …