We develop a model of relational contracts with moral hazard and asymmetric persistent information about an employee's type. We find that the form of the optimal contract depends on the job characteristics as well as the distribution of employees' talent. Bonus contracts are more likely to be...

The paper studies human capital accumulation over workers' careers in an on the job search setting with heterogenous firms. In renegotiation proof employment con- tracts, more productive firms provide more training. Both general and specific training induce higher wages within jobs, and with...

We develop a product market theory that explains why firms invest in general training of their workers. We consider a model where firms first decide whether to invest in general human capital, then make wage offers for each others’ trained employees and finally engage in imperfect product...

This paper explores for the first time the impact of a demand-driven training program on labor turnover at both firm and worker level. Launched in 2014 by the Ministry of Development, Industry and Trade (MDIC in Portuguese), Pronatec-MDIC allows firms to demand courses which some of their...

In-service teacher training aims to improve the supply of public education. A randomized experiment was conducted in Mexico to test whether teacher training could increase teacher efficiency in public secondary schools. After seven and a half months of exposure to a trained teacher, students...

This paper studies the probability of receiving employer-paid training and training independently of who finance it for permanent and temporary workers in Chile. We use data from the Social Protection Survey, EPS, which allow us to construct a panel of workers with information from 2002, 2004,...