This paper studies a noncooperative model of network formation. Built upon the two-way flow model of Bala and Goyal …

Most literature in strategic network formation shows that there is a substantial tension between stability and … efficiency. In this note, I show that such is not the case in the twoway flow model with small decay studied by Bala and Goyal … (2000a) and De Jaegher and Kamphorst (2015). Specifically, I show that every link receiver in a Nash network serves as an …

neighbors in the social network. The same activities often exert externalities that cumulate in "stocks" affecting agents … network of social relations, as agents display strategic substitution with distance-two neighbors. We show that behavior is … behavior and key-players tend to move to the periphery of the network, and we discuss the effect of close-knit communities and …

present. I do so by extending the two-way flow network with small decay of De Jaegher and Kamphorst (J ECON BEHAV ORGAN, 2015 …

, I provide a proposition that generalizes the results of these two models by stating that: (i) Strict Nash network … network as in Billand et al (2011). This proposition requires that a certain restriction on link formation cost (called …

Network structure has a significant role in determining the outcomes of many socioeconomic relationships, including the … antagonistic ones. In this paper we study a situation in which agents, embedded in a network, simultaneously play interrelated … bilateral contest games with their neighbors. Interrelatedness of contests induces complex local and global network effects. We …

that the completely connected network is stable, although, its exact structure, and thus contagion implications, is …

particular, if the linking costs are not too low and not too high, at least one such network is pairwise stable. Moreover, in … explanation for many core-periphery structures observed in real life social networks. -- Network Formation ; Heterogeneity …

Two project leaders (or entrepreneurs) in a network, which captures social relations, recruit players in a strategic … selects one equilibrium at a time. An agent's expected payoff is related to his position in the network, though no centrality …