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We study the timing of leniency applications using a novel application of multi-spell discrete-time survival analysis for a sample of cartels prosecuted by the European Commission between 1996 and 2014. The start of a Commission investigation does not affect the rate by which conspirators apply...
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In this paper, we tackle the dilemma of pruning versus proliferation in a vertically differentiated oligopoly under the assumption that some firms collude and control both the range of variants for sale and their corresponding prices, likewise a multiproduct firm. We analyse whether pruning...
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The theoretical literature on collusion in auctions suggests that the first-price mechanism can deter the formation of bidding rings. In equilibrium, collusive negotiations are either successful or are avoided altogether, hence such analysis neglects the effects of failed collusion attempts. In...
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more likely to leave the cartel for small quality differences, high quality firms determine cartel stability when the …
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. Within this setting, we study four types of price-fixing agreement: (i) a segment-wide cartel in the premium submarket only …, (ii) a segment-wide cartel in the standard submarket only, (iii) two segment-wide cartels, and (iv) an industrywide cartel …-wide cartel prefers to maintain market shares at pre-collusive levels. The impact on consumer and social welfare critically …
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cartel members and study the size of the contracts affected or potentially affected by the illegal activity, comparing them …
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