Showing 1 - 10 of 478
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003590108
The theoretical literature on collusion in auctions suggests that the first-price mechanism can deter the formation of bidding rings. In equilibrium, collusive negotiations are either successful or are avoided altogether, hence such analysis neglects the effects of failed collusion attempts. In...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010472820
bribes and the firms paying bribes affect the equilibrium level of corruption in the sector. Bribe takers (utility employees …) are more likely to take bribes in countries with greater constraints on utility capacity, lower levels of competition in …Many recent studies have looked at the macroeconomic, cultural and institutional determinants of corruption at the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011597961
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012199551
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012434314
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013170229
these policies commonly relies on information provided by a bureaucracy. Environmental bureaucrats often have a political …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010380647
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012244550
A well-known theoretical result in the contest literature is that greater heterogeneity decreases performance of contestants because of the "discouragement effect." Leveling the playing field by favoring weaker contestants through bid-caps and favorable tie-breaking rules can reduce the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011473887
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003308813