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Tragedy of the commons and evolutionary games in social networks : the economics of social punishment
Marco, Jorge; Goetz, Renan - 2017
This study revisits the problem of the tragedy of the commons. Extracting agents participate in an evolutionary game in a complex social network and are subject to social pressure if they do not comply with the social norms. Social pressure depends on the dynamics of the resource, the network...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011672530
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Computational complexity in additive hedonic games
Dimitrov, Dinko; Sung, Shao Chin - 2008
We investigate the computational complexity of several decision problems in hedonic coalition formation games and demonstrate that attaining stability in such games remains NP-hard even when they are additive. Precisely, we prove that when either core stability or strict core stability is under...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008799165
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On the nonemptiness of approximate cores of large games
Allouch, Nizar; Wooders, Myrna Holtz - 2014
We provide a new proof of the non-emptiness of approximate cores of games with many players of a finite number of types. Earlier papers in the literature proceed by showing that, for games with many players, equal-treatment cores of their "balanced cover games", which are non-empty, can be...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010472889
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An adaptation-mitigation game: does adaptation promote participation in international environmental agreements?
Borrero, Miguel; Rubio, Santiago J. - 2021
This paper studies how the investment in adaptation can influence the participation in an international environmental agreement (IEA) when countries decide in adaptation before they choose their levels of emissions. Two types of agreements are studied, a complete agreement for which countries...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012519985
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Bargaining and power
Karos, Dominik - 2013
Given a simple game, a power configuration specifies the power of each player in each winning coalition. We introduce a new power configuration which takes into account bargaining among players in coalitions. We show that under very weak conditions on a bargaining solution there is a power...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010189489
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What can facilitate cooperation : fairness, ineaulity aversion, punishment, norms or trust?
Brandt, Urs Steiner - 2008
Almost all economic and public choice models assume that all people are exclusively pursuing their own material self-interests and do not care about "social" goals per se. Several (laboratory) experiments address the question of the general validity of this assumption. A consistent conclusion...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003821574
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Punish and perish?
Antoci, Angelo; Zarri, Luca - 2011
framework where punishment ("stick") and rewarding ("carrot") options are available, here we show analytically that the presence … of cooperators who don't punish in the population makes altruistic punishment evolutionarily weak. We show that … cooperation breaks down and strong reciprocity is maladaptive if costly punishment means "punishing defectors" and, even more so …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009298308
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Matching in the Kolm triangle : interiority and participation constraints of matching equilibria
Buchholz, Wolfgang; Cornes, Richard; Rübbelke, Dirk T. G. - 2019
In this paper we show how the Kolm triangle method, which is a standard tool for visualizing allocations in a public good economy, can also be used to provide a diagrammatical exposition of matching mechanisms and their effects on public good supply and welfare. In particular, we describe, on...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012016875
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An implementation approach to rotation programs
Korpela, Ville; Lombardi, Michele; Saulle, Riccardo D. - 2021
Rotation programs are widely used in societies. Some examples are job rotations, rotation schemes in the management of common-pool resources, and rotation procedures in fair division problems. We study rotation programs via the implementation of Pareto efficient social choice rules under...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012519973
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Delegation and public pressure in a threshold public goods game : theory and experimental evidence
İriş, Doruk; Lee, Jungmin; Tavoni, Alessandro - 2016
The provision of global public goods, such as climate change mitigation and managing fisheries to avoid overharvesting, requires the coordination of national contributions. The contributions are managed by elected governments who, in turn, are subject to public pressure on the matter. In an...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011457585