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therefore to a drop in the return to investment. -- Principal Agent ; Moral Hazard ; Hidden Action ; Incentives ; Survival …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008732070
This paper investigates the design of incentives in a dynamic adverse selection framework when agents’ production technologies display learning effects and agents’ rate of learning is private knowledge. In a simple two-period model with full commitment available to the principal, we show...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003892452
screen out high credit risk and potentially increase access to credit for small business owners in Peru. We use … entrepreneurs who were offered a loan based on the traditional credit-scoring method versus the EFL tool. We find that the … entrepreneurs - i.e., those with a credit history. For unbanked entrepreneurs - i.e., those without a credit history - using the EFL …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011485359
This paper aims to characterise a dynamic, incentive-compatible contract for the provision of health services, allowing for both moral hazard and adverse selection. Patients' severity changes over time following a stochastic process and is private information of the provider. We characterise the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014342117
We assess the usefulness of stochastic redistribution among a continuum of risk-averse agents with quasilinear utilities in labor. Agents differ according to their consumption tastes, which remain private information. We identify circumstances where stochastic redistribution is socially...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013464907
In a continuous-time setting, we study the design of a dynamic contract between a government and a private entity, wherein the latter commits to pay the government in return for the exclusive right to sell a service by operating a public facility. Private revenues are modelled as depending on...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013547855
We consider a long-term contractual relationship in which a buyer procures a fixed quantity of a product from a supplier and then sells it on the market. The production cost is private information and evolves randomly over time. The solution to this dynamic principal-agent problem involves a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014478916
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011914184
We investigate the problem of subsidising afforestation when private information exists with respect to the level of private utility derived from the project. We develop a simple model that allows for an intelligent design of contracts when information is asymmetric. The model involves the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011601121
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000978065