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Coalition formation in games without synergies
Currarini, Sergio; Marini, Marco - 2004
This paper establishes sufficient conditions for the existence of a stable coalition structure in the coalition … unanimity game of coalition formation, first defined by Hart and Kurz (1983) and more recently studied by Yi (1997, 2000). Our … conditions are defined on the strategic form game used to derive the payoffs the game of coalition formation. We show that if no …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011600510
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Contributing or free-riding? : a theory of endogenous lobby formation
Furusawa, Taiji (contributor); Konishi, Hideo (contributor) - 2008
schemes in order to influence the government’s choice on the level of provision of public goods. Using perfectly coalition …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003714888
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The coalitional Nash bargaining solution with simultaneous payoff demands
Nieva, Ricardo - 2015
We consider a standard coalitional bargaining game where once a coalition forms it exits as in Okada (2011), however … chosen with equal probability. If that is the case, she can choose any coalition she belongs to. However, a coalition can …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011296159
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Multilateral bargaining in networks : on the prevalence of inefficiencies
Lee, Joosung - 2015
We introduce a noncooperative multilateral bargaining model for a network-restricted environment, in which players can communicate only with their neighbors. Each player strategically chooses the bargaining partners among the neighbors to buy out their communication links with upfront transfers....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011279698
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International environmental agreements with asymmetric countries : climate clubs vs. global cooperation
Hagen, Achim; Eisenack, Klaus - 2015
We investigate whether global cooperation for emission abatement can be improved if asymmetric countries can sign different parallel environmental agreements. The analysis assumes a two-stage game theoretical model. Conditions for self-enforcing sets of agreements and the resulting total...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011283164
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Bottom-up strategic linking of carbon markets : which climate coalitions would farsighted players form?
Heitzig, Jobst - 2013
We present typical scenarios and general insights from a novel dynamic model of farsighted climate coalition formation … scenarios of such a climate coalition formation process which show that a first-best state with a coordinated global carbon …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009756287
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Pairing games and markets
Alkan, Ahmet; Tuncay, Alparslan - 2014
Pairing Games or Markets studied here are the non-two-sided NTU generalization of assignment games. We show that the Equilibrium Set is nonempty, that it is the set of stable allocations or the set of semistable allocations, and that it has several notable structural properties. We also...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010350435
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On the nonemptiness of approximate cores of large games
Allouch, Nizar; Wooders, Myrna Holtz - 2014
We provide a new proof of the non-emptiness of approximate cores of games with many players of a finite number of types. Earlier papers in the literature proceed by showing that, for games with many players, equal-treatment cores of their "balanced cover games", which are non-empty, can be...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010472889
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Bargaining and power
Karos, Dominik - 2013
Given a simple game, a power configuration specifies the power of each player in each winning coalition. We introduce a … show that given this power configuration there is a coalition which is both internally and Nash stable. We consider two … investigate how infeasible coalition might affect the outcome and apply our model to the German parliament …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010189489
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Simple priorities and core stability in hedonic games
Dimitrov, Dinko; Borm, Peter; Hendrickx, Ruud L. P.; … - 2004
In this paper we study hedonic games where each player views every other player either as a friend or as an enemy. Two simple priority criteria for comparison of coalitions are suggested, and the corresponding preference restrictions based on appreciation of friends and aversion to enemies are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011601129