neglected. We introduce them into a standard oligopoly model of horizontal merger by assuming an (empirically supported …) decrease in labour demand due to merger-specific synergies and derive welfare effects. We find that efficiency benefits from …-side effects remain negligible. Eventually, policy conclusions for merger control are discussed. -- horizontal mergers …

employment of merger simulation models in merger control procedures during the past almost 15 years. Merger simulation is … of state-of-the-art merger simulation models and review their previous employment in merger cases as well as the problems … and limitations currently associated with their use in merger control. In summary, merger simulation models represent an …

mergers. If this assumption held, a positive external effect of a proposed merger would represent a sufficient condition to … allow the merger. However, the empirical picture on mergers and acquisitions reveals a significant share of unprofitable … considerable impact on merger policy conclusions: while several insights of the original FSF are corroborated (f.i. efficiency …

among incumbent banks on competition and discuss when, depending on the pre-merger structure of the market and geographic … distribution of branches, the merger is anti-competitive. The paper has implications for competition policy as it suggests an … Structure ; Merger Policy …

We consider a setting in which two potential merger partners each possess private information pertaining both to the … ex-post regret an unavoidable phenomenon in merger negotiations. To this end, we consider ex-post incentive compatible … mechanisms, which use both players' reports to determine whether or not a merger will take place and what each player will earn …

creation since merger regulations are ex ante in nature. The present study is an attempt to understand how far the expected …

We analyze a Bayesian merger game under two-sided asymmetric information about firm types. We show that the standard … prediction of the lemons market model–if any, only low-type firms are traded–is likely to be misleading: Merger returns, i.e. the … difference between pre- and post-merger profits, are not necessarily higher for low-type firms. This has two implications. First …