We investigate the computational complexity of several decision problems in hedonic coalition formation games and demonstrate that attaining stability in such games remains NP-hard even when they are additive. Precisely, we prove that when either core stability or strict core stability is under...

Aiming to explain the European divide with respect to social and political values, scholars in the past have relied on a simplified four- (or even two-) dimensional regime model which tranches the continent according to the social capacities of its inhabitants. This "cartography" of "Social...

Social capital is often represented by generalized trust - the degree to which one trusts "most (unknown) people". It is assumed to be enhanced by diverse group interactions. In the social capital literature, it is opposed by particularized trust, which represents our mutual confidence in...

We introduce the notion of language disenfranchisement which arises if the number of EU working languages is reduced. We use the data on language proficiency in EU and show that, in spite of the widespread knowledge of English, the retention of French and German as working languages in essential...

We analyse interethnic cooperation in an infinitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma when members of one group are unable to target punishment towards individual defectors from the other group. We first show that indiscriminate outgroup punishment may sustain cooperation in this setting. Our main...

This paper extends the analysis of liberal principles in social choice recently proposed by Mariotti and Veneziani (2009a) to infinitely-lived societies. First, a novel characterisation of the inegalitarian leximax social welfare relation is provided based on the Individual Benefit Principle,...

Suflicientarianism is a prominent approach in political philosophy and in policy analyses. However, it is virtually absent from the formal normative economics liter­ature. We analyse suflicientarianism axiomatically in the context of the allocation of opportunities (formalised as chances of...

A Hard Problem is a collective choice problem in which the only feasible alternatives apart from the status quo consist of a welfare gain to some people (the Winners) and a welfare loss to the others (the Losers). These problems are typical in a number of settings, such as climate action,...

We provide three alternative characterizations of the proportional solution defined on compact and comprehensive bargaining problems with claims that are not necessarily convex. One characterization result is obtained by using, together with other standard axioms, two solidarity axioms. Another...

This paper examines the role of simplified heuristics in the formation of preferences for public goods. Political scientists have suggested that voters use simplified heuristics based on the positions of familiar parties to infer how a proposed policy will affect them and to cast a vote in line...