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Harmful signaling in matching markets
Kushnir, Alexey - 2010
Some labor markets have recently developed formal signalling mechanisms, e.g. the signalling for interviews in the job … signalling mechanism is harmful for this environment. Though signals transmit previously unavailable information, they also … facilitate information asymmetry that leads to coordination failures. As a result, the introduction of a signalling mechanism …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008737789
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Optimal random taxation and redistribution
Gauthier, Stéphane; Laroque, Guy - 2022
We assess the usefulness of stochastic redistribution among a continuum of risk-averse agents with quasilinear utilities in labor. Agents differ according to their consumption tastes, which remain private information. We identify circumstances where stochastic redistribution is socially...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013464907
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Cheap talk with correlated signals
Chand, A. K. S.; Currarini, Sergio; Ursino, Giovanni - 2013
We consider a game of information transmission, with one informed decision maker gathering information from one or more informed senders. Private information is (conditionally) correlated across players, and communication is cheap talk. For the one sender case, we show that correlation...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010189326
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Why do voters support procyclical fiscal policies? : experimental evidence from Latin America
Ardanaz, Martin; Hübscher, Evelyne; Keefer, Philip; … - 2023
Governments often pursue procyclical fiscal policies, even though they reduce voter welfare. Is this because voters actually prefer procyclical policies? The analysis in this paper exploits the first individual-level evidence from an original survey of 12,000 respondents in 8 countries across...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014460802
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Merger mechanisms
Brusco, Sandro; Lopomo, Giuseppe; Viswanathan, S. - 2004
A firm can merge with one of n potential partners. The owner of each firm has private information about both his firm's stand-alone value and a component of the synergies that would be realized by the merger involving his firm. We characterize incentive-efficient mechanisms in two cases. First,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599056
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Monopolistic screening under learning by doing
Gärtner, Dennis - 2007
This paper investigates the design of incentives in a dynamic adverse selection framework when agents’ production technologies display learning effects and agents’ rate of learning is private knowledge. In a simple two-period model with full commitment available to the principal, we show...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003892452
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Merger negotiations and ex-post regret
Gärtner, Dennis (contributor);  … - 2007
We consider a setting in which two potential merger partners each possess private information pertaining both to the profitability of the merged entity and to stand-alone profits, and we investigate the extent to which this private information makes ex-post regret an unavoidable phenomenon in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003387546
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Endogenizing private information : incentive contracts under learning by doing
Gärtner, Dennis (contributor) - 2004 - [Elektronische Ressource]
This paper investigates the design of incentives in a dynamic adverse selection framework when agents’ production technologies display learning effects and agents’ rate of learning is private knowledge. In a simple two-period model with full commitment available to the principal, we show...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002521609
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Weddings with uncertain prospects : mergers under asymmetric information
Borek, Thomas (contributor); Bühler, Stefan (contributor);  … - 2004 - [Elektronische Ressource]
We provide a framework for analyzing bilateral mergers when there is two-sided asymmetric information about firms’ types. We show that there is always a "no-merger" equilibrium where firms do not consent to a merger, irrespective of their type. There may also be a "cut-off" equilibrium if the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001729427
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Group decision-making in the shadow of disagreement
Eliaz, Kfir; Ray, Debraj; Razin, Ronny - 2004
A model of group decision-making is studied, in which one of two alternatives must be chosen. While group members differ in their valuations of the alternatives, everybody prefers some alternative to disagreement. Our model is distinguished by three features: private information regarding...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011603226