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; experiment ; overbidding …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003892457
-price sequential and first-price combinatorial bidding. The design of the experiment is based on experiences from a public procurement … mechanism is demonstrated to be most efficient. The second part of the paper describes how the lab experiment was followed up by … a field test of a combinatorial procurement auction of road markings. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011591112
Drawing on the real-options theory we analyse bidding behaviour in a sealed-bid-first-score procurement auction where …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599251
A buyer with downward slopping demand faces a number of unit supply sellers. The paper characterizes optimal auctions in this setting. For the symmetric case, a uniform auction (with price equal to lowest rejected offer) is optimal when complemented with reserve prices for different quantities...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011607130
When procurement contracts are incomplete, they are frequently changed after the contract is awarded to the lowest …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011607047
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011695101
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012817421
This paper studies revenue-maximizing mechanisms for a monopolist who expects her buyers to resell in a secondary market. We consider two modes of resale: the first is to a third party who does not participate in the primary market; the second is inter-bidders resale, where the winner in the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011591039
We consider a dynamic auction environment with a long-lived seller and short-lived buyers mediated by a third party. A mediator has incomplete information about traders' values and selects an auction mechanism to maximize her expected revenue. We characterize mediator-optimal mechanisms and show...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008659956
We use perturbation analysis to study independent private-value all-pay auctions with weakly risk-averse buyers. We show that under weak risk aversion: 1) Buyers with low values bid lower and buyers with high values bid higher than they would bid in the risk neutral case. 2) Buyers with low...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599258