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Auctioning vs. grandfathering in cap-and-trade systems with market power and incomplete information
Alvarez González, Francisco; Jarque Andrés, Francisco - 2013
We compare auctioning and grandfathering as allocation mechanisms of emission permits when there is a secondary market with market power and the firms have private information. Based on real-life cases such as the EU ETS, we consider a multi-unit, multi-bid uniform auction, modelled as a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010226080
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Financial contracts as coordination device
Le Coq, Chloé; Schwenen, Sebastian - 2019
We study the use of financial contracts as bid-coordinating device in multi-unit uniform price auctions. Coordination is required whenever firms face a volunteer's dilemma in pricing strategies: one firm (the "volunteer") is needed to increase the market clearing price. Volunteering, however, is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012132321
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Procurement with unenforceable contract time and the law of liquidated damages
Dosi, Cesare; Moretto, Michele - 2012
Time overruns are common in public works and are not confined to inherently complex tasks. One explanation advanced in …. By exploiting the real-option approach, we examine how the inability to force sellers to meet the contract time … ; Cost Uncertainty ; Time Overruns ; Liquidated Damages ; Real Options …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009565538
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Participation in international environmental agreements : the role of timing and regulation
Finus, Michael (contributor); Rundshagen, Bianca (contributor) - 2005
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003356109
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All-Pay auctions with negative prize externalities : theory and experimental evidence
Sacco, Dario; Schmutzler, Armin - 2008
The paper characterizes the mixed-strategy equilibria in all-pay auctions with endogenous prizes that depend positively on own effort and negatively on the effort of competitors. Such auctions arise naturally in the context of investment games, lobbying games, and promotion tournaments. We also...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003892457
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Core-stable rings in second price auctions with common values
Forges, Françoise; Orzach, Ram - 2010
In a common value auction in which the information partitions of the bidders are connected, all rings are core-stable. More precisely, the ex ante expected utilities of rings, at the (noncooperative) sophisticated equilibrium proposed by Einy, Haimanko, Orzach and Sela (Journal of Mathematical...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008737094
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Auctioning monopoly franchises : award criteria and service launch requirements
Moretto, Michele; Dosi, Cesare - 2009
that concessioning without imposing rollout time limits may or may not provide a higher expected social value, depending on … the concessioning conditions. -- Concessions ; Auctions ; Award criteria ; Service Rollout Time limits …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008810289
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Optimal mechanisms for an auction mediator
Matros, Alexander; Zapechelnyuk, Andriy - 2010
We consider a dynamic auction environment with a long-lived seller and short-lived buyers mediated by a third party. A mediator has incomplete information about traders' values and selects an auction mechanism to maximize her expected revenue. We characterize mediator-optimal mechanisms and show...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008659956
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Bidding for conservation contracts
Di Corato, Luca; Dosi, Cesare; Moretto, Michele - 2014
Contracts providing payments for not developing natural areas, or for removing cropland from production, generally require long-term commitments. Landowners, however, can decide to prematurely terminate the contract when the opportunity cost of complying with conservation requirements increases....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010380650
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Auction mechanisms and bidder collusion : bribes, signals and selection
Llorente-Saguer, Aniol; Zultan, Ro’i - 2014 - This version: November 20, 2014
The theoretical literature on collusion in auctions suggests that the first-price mechanism can deter the formation of bidding rings. In equilibrium, collusive negotiations are either successful or are avoided altogether, hence such analysis neglects the effects of failed collusion attempts. In...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010472820