Imperfect private monitoring in an infinitely repeated discounted Prisoner's Dilemma played on a communication network is studied. Players observe their direct neighbors' behavior only, but communicate strategically the repeated game's history throughout the network. The delay in receiving this...

We analyse interethnic cooperation in an infinitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma when members of one group are unable to target punishment towards individual defectors from the other group. We first show that indiscriminate outgroup punishment may sustain cooperation in this setting. Our main...

This report constitutes the first deliverable of the project ENGIME Economic Growth and Innovation in Multicultural Environments, financed by the European Commission FP5 Key Action: Improving socio-economic knowledge base. Contract HPSE-CT2001-50007

This paper models the dynamic process through which a large society may succeed in building up its social capital by establishing a stable and dense pattern of interaction among its members. In the model, agents interact according to a collection of infinitely repeated Prisoner's Dilemmas played...