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This paper investigates the design of incentives in a dynamic adverse selection framework when agents’ production technologies display learning effects and agents’ rate of learning is private knowledge. In a simple two-period model with full commitment available to the principal, we show...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003892452
The theoretical literature on collusion in auctions suggests that the first-price mechanism can deter the formation of bidding rings. In equilibrium, collusive negotiations are either successful or are avoided altogether, hence such analysis neglects the effects of failed collusion attempts. In...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010472820
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We study the timing of leniency applications using a novel application of multi-spell discrete-time survival analysis for a sample of cartels prosecuted by the European Commission between 1996 and 2014. The start of a Commission investigation does not affect the rate by which conspirators apply...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011435719
In this paper, we tackle the dilemma of pruning versus proliferation in a vertically differentiated oligopoly under the assumption that some firms collude and control both the range of variants for sale and their corresponding prices, likewise a multiproduct firm. We analyse whether pruning...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011451580
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. Within this setting, we study four types of price-fixing agreement: (i) a segment-wide cartel in the premium submarket only …, (ii) a segment-wide cartel in the standard submarket only, (iii) two segment-wide cartels, and (iv) an industrywide cartel …-wide cartel prefers to maintain market shares at pre-collusive levels. The impact on consumer and social welfare critically …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012306748
We investigate the problem of subsidising afforestation when private information exists with respect to the level of private utility derived from the project. We develop a simple model that allows for an intelligent design of contracts when information is asymmetric. The model involves the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011601121
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concept of internal and external stability to a cartel formation game. It is shown that only if benefits from global abatement … theory. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011591872